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Dupré and Nicholson (2018) defend the metaphysical thesis that the
‘living world’ is not composed of things or substances, as traditionally
believed, but of processes. They advocate a process – as opposed to a
substance – metaphysics and ontology, which results to be more
empirically adequate to what contemporary biology suggests. Their
ultimate view, however, is that there are compelling reasons to believe
that contemporary physics, too, strongly suggests an analogous
process-based conception as to the ‘physical world’. Consequently, they
argue that if this were the case, then the whole nature should be
understood as consisting of ‘processes all the way down’. The aim of this
paper is to provide some further reasons supporting the correctness of
this view in the framework of contemporary fundamental physics. To
this end, I examine the metaphysical and ontological underpinnings of
Rovelli’s view of loop quantum gravity. I show that it consists of a
timeless yet dynamical, radically relationalist, conception ultimately
based on an event and process metaphysics and ontology according to
which the ‘physical world’ is, fundamentally, a network of interacting
quantum dynamical processes. Therefore, this suggests that at least ‘all
the way down’ to the Planck scale, nature appears indeed to be
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1 Introduction
In their recent ‘Manifesto for a Processual Philosophy of Biology’ (Nicholson
and Dupré, 2018), John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson defend the metaphysical
thesis that ‘the world – at least as living beings are concerned – is made up
not of substantial particles or things, as philosophers have overwhelmingly
supposed, but of processes. It is dynamic through and through’ (p. 3). Their
general argument is that the traditional substance metaphysics and ontology
that has dominated both philosophy and science since Parmenides, Plato and
Aristotle, turns out to be inadequate to account for the ‘living world’ according
to contemporary biology. Instead, they argue for a process metaphysics and
ontology for which ‘processes must be, in some sense, more fundamental than
things’ (p. 4). In short, using the traditional metaphysical dichotomy between
being and becoming, we might say that, on their view, becoming (process,
change, event) is prior to, and more fundamental than, being (substance, stasis,
thing).
Dupré and Nicholson make clear that their project is a research in the
metaphysics of science, understood as a ‘naturalistic metaphysics’, for which
philosophy ‘must proceed in dialogue with what science actually tells us about
the world’ (Nicholson and Dupré, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, although their analysis is
focused on the ‘living world’, they ultimately believe that ‘there are compelling
reasons to interpret the physical world more generally in terms of processes as
well’ (pp. 4-5; my emphasis). Contemporary physics, and quantum physics
in particular, they argue, seems in fact to support a process – as opposed to a
‘thing’, ‘particle-like’, substance – metaphysics. Consequently, if this would turn
out to be correct, they conclude, then the whole nature should be understood
as consisting of ‘processes all the way down’ (p. 13).
My aim in this paper is to provide some further reasons in support of the
correctness of this view in the framework of contemporary fundamental physics
and, specifically, according to Carlo Rovelli’s view of loop quantum gravity
(LQG) (Rovelli, 2004, 2020; Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014). Rovelli states concisely
his view as follows:
Fundamental physics turns out to work much better in the
language of becoming than in the language of being. Quantum
theory is about transitions, general relativity about events. Events
happen, rather than are, and this we call ‘becoming’. [. . . ]. The
best language for describing the universe remains a language of
happening and becoming, not a language of being. Even more so
when we fold quantum theory in. This is the language used in
LQG. LQG describes reality in terms of processes. The amplitudes
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of the theory determine probabilities for processes to happen. This
is a language of becoming, not being (Rovelli, 2020, p. 124).
In what follows, I would like simply to explain the metaphysical and ontological
underpinnings of this process-based conception of the physical world.
2 The ontology of loop quantum gravity
To understand the ontology of LQG according to Rovelli, we have at least three
ontological claims to consider:
(1) At the fundamental level (i.e. at the Planck scale), there is no preferred
observable time variable t, or non-dynamical background spacetime;
(2) there are no things or objects as concrete particulars or individual objects
(i.e. substance-like entities bearing properties), but only quantum events
and relations between events;
(3) events, as happenings and occurrences, are change simpliciter.
The first claim corresponds to Rovelli’s well known, though often
misunderstood, claim that, fundamentally, ‘time does not exist’ (Rovelli,
2016). The apparent disappearance of time or spacetime is one of the most
challenging implications of basically all main approaches to quantum gravity;
yet, as we shall see, according to LQG it is in some sense a natural
consequence of the requirement of background independence inherited from
general relativity (GR). Background independence is the idea that there is no
absolute, fixed, non-dynamical spacetime, and thus no preferred time
coordinate, against which and with respect to which change, and thus the
dynamics of physical systems, unfolds, as instead is the case with all
non-general-relativistic physics (Belot, 2011; Smolin, 2006). Indeed, in
non-general-relativistic theories, the dynamics of physical systems is defined in
terms of the evolution of states and the relevant physical variables in function
of an external time parameter – as in classical mechanics and standard
quantum mechanics (QM), or a non-dynamical background spacetime – as in
special relativity and standard quantum field theory (QFT). Therefore,
Rovelli’s claim that, fundamentally, ‘there is no time’, that ‘time does not
exist’, and thus that in some sense the world is timeless or non-spatiotemporal,
is to be understood primarily as a consequence of the assumption of
background independence as one of the fundamental principles of modern
physics after GR. The non-existence of time or spacetime at the Planck scale,
however, does not mean that it cannot exist, generally speaking, at
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macroscopic scales. The so-called ‘emergence’ of time or spacetime at the
classical limit is indeed one of the main technical and conceptual problems of
virtually all approaches to quantum gravity (see, e.g., Huggett et al., 2013,
2020; Oriti, 2014, 2018). Rovelli’s view is that we should maintain a
multi-layered and context-based conception of space, time and spacetime,
which, in the case of time, extends from its apparent absence in fundamental
physics to our common experience of time related to cognitive and
neurobiological processes, passing through GR, thermodynamics, statistical
mechanics, and so on. On this view, then, the notion of time becomes relevant
only for coarse-grained approximations of physical reality (Rovelli, 2020).
Rovelli’s second ontological claim means that the physical world according
to LQG is not composed of ‘things’ or ‘substances’ persisting in time and
undergoing property changes; neither, of course, that the world itself is a sort
of ‘thing’ or ‘substance’ as the ‘totality’ of all existing things. As we shall
see, LQG suggests instead that the physical world consists of nothing but
interacting quantum dynamical entities (precisely, quantum fields), including
spacetime, and, ultimately, events and processes in interaction to each other.
This means that LQG holds a relational quantum field, as opposed to particle,
ontology, ultimately based on an event and process, as opposed to object or
substance, ontology. Thus, LQG is realist about events and processes and,
conversely, anti-realist, and fundamentally eliminativist, about things, objects,
substances. Note that Rovelli’s understanding of the notion of relation between
events, does not properly concern the traditional substantivalism or absolutism
vs. relationalism debate about space, time and spacetime. For Rovelli, such
debate essentially reduces to a merely verbal issue, after GR (Rovelli, 2004).
As we shall see, his view instead consists of a much more radical conception
– that I will thus call radical relationalism – as to the very relational nature
of dynamics, that is to say, how physics describes the processes occurring in
the physical interactions between physical systems and how it accounts for
their relative dynamical evolution. In this sense, Rovelli’s radical relationalism
concerns how to interpret and even reformulate modern physics in order to
address the problem of quantum gravity of how to describe the background-
independent quantum dynamics of spacetime.
Finally, Rovelli’s third claim as to the nature of events means that an event
is not conceived of in traditional philosophical terms as a process of change
happening or occurring to something over time (since, to restate, fundamentally,
there are no things and there is no time); it is change or process as such.
This ontological claim is extremely important, for it is precisely what Rovelli
means by ‘becoming ’: becoming is change as happening of events (see, e.g.,
Rovelli, 2018a, 2020). Although I will not address this aspect, I believe that
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this understanding of becoming may have implications for contemporary debates
in the metaphysics of time. For instance, Rovelli’s view suggests that neither
the standard A-theory of time of a ‘change of time’ as ‘passage of time’ or
‘temporal becoming’ (i.e. the ‘becoming’ present of the future and past of the
present) nor the standard B-theory of time of ‘change in time’ as ‘temporal
difference’ (i.e. change of some thing or object having different properties at
different times) turn out to be relevant at the fundamental level, for, again,
there are no things or objects and there is no time with respect to which events
happen. A further point worth to mention is that Rovelli’s view of becoming
does not mean that the happening of events is a sort of ‘coming into being’ of
events at a spacetime position (x, t), as it is standard in relativity theories. This
understanding is inadequate at the fundamental level, too, first, because the
background independence of LQG excludes in principle any embedding in some
underlying spacetime structure, and, second, because the expected quantum
features of spacetime render the very notion of position no longer well-defined.
Consequently, events cannot be thought of as to happen neither in space nor in
time. Thus, on Rovelli’s view, fundamentally, becoming is neither spatial nor
temporal, it is the non-spatiotemporal process of the happening of events.
This brief account of the ontology of LQG obviously raises countless
questions, but let me state what, in my view, are its most far-reaching
metaphysical and ontological implications. First, the world appears to be
fundamentally non-spatiotemporal (i.e., there is no classical spacetime); it is
timeless or atemporal; yet, crucially, it is not changeless or static (i.e.
non-dynamical). Thus, there is no time, but there is change. This point, in my
view, has been largely underestimated if not entirely misunderstood in the
philosophical literature. Rovelli’s view has been often, erroneously, associated
to some form of Parmenidean view (see, e.g., Belot and Earman, 2001; Healey,
2002; Huggett et al., 2013), such as that, for instance, advocated by Julian
Barbour (1999). On Barbour’s view, indeed, the disappearance of time
involves that of change, so that, as he puts it, ‘the quantum universe is static.
Nothing happens; there is being but not becoming. The flow of time and
motion are illusions’ (Barbour, 2009, p. 2). Rovelli’s view is diametrically the
opposite. He explicitly insists that from the claim that, fundamentally, there is
no time, it does not follow that nothing changes or happens (see, e.g., Rovelli,
2016, 2014). On the contrary, despite being atemporal, the world is definitely
dynamic, not static. Moreover, since there are no things or substances but
only events, on Rovelli’s view there is in fact nothing but change as happening
of events (Rovelli, 2018a, pp. 85-86); and since this is what he means by
‘becoming’, his view entails the idea of a timeless or atemporal becoming. This
leads to the second, and in fact major, metaphysical and ontological
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implication: LQG suggests a radical rejection of any substance metaphysics in
favour of a process metaphysics for which becoming is more fundamental than
being.
But how to make sense of an atemporal becoming; that is, a ‘world without
time’ in which however there are changes, processes, events? Furthermore,
how to make sense of a world of ceaseless becoming, of nothing but interacting
processes and happening of events, without any substantial being? To try to
answer these questions we need, first, to understand the radical relationalism at
the core of fundamental physics. This will allow us, second, to understand the
radical ‘process turn’ that LQG ultimately suggests.
3 The radical relationalism of contemporary
fundamental physics
According to Rovelli, to understand the relationalism of modern and
contemporary fundamental physics, we need to comprehend, first, the
profound physical meaning of GR, second, its connection to quantum theory,
and, finally, what such a connection involves for a quantum theory of gravity,
and, specifically, for LQG. Let me consider then these points in turn.
3.1 The relationalism of general relativity
The core idea of GR, Rovelli argues, is that ‘there are only dynamical physical
entities’ (Rovelli, 2006, p. 30). The main implication of the background
dependence of all non-general-relativistic physics was the presupposition of an
ontological distinction between space and time or spacetime, on the one hand,
and the dynamical entities (particles and fields), on the other. The ontology of
the physical world, that is, consisted of an absolute, fixed, non-dynamical
background space and time or spacetime in which particles and fields moved
and interacted. The background independence of GR is the understanding that
‘there is no distinction between non-dynamical background and dynamical
physical variables’ (Rovelli, 2007, p. 1310). That means that if we remove the
dynamical entities in non-general-relativistic physics, what remains is space
and time or spacetime. If we do the same in GR, what remains is nothing
(Rovelli, 2004, p. 9). The ultimate reason for this is that in GR, Rovelli states,
‘spacetime and the gravitational field are the same entity’ (ibid.).
This means that, against the pre-general-relativistic ontological assumption
of a background space and time or spacetime independent of particles and fields,
GR removes such an assumption by describing gravity, and thus spacetime, in
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field-theoretical terms (Rovelli, 2020). Note that Rovelli thoroughly follows here
Einstein, who, in a famous passage writes:
In accordance with classical mechanics and according to the special
theory of relativity, space (space-time) has an existence independent
of matter and field. [. . . ]. On the basis of the general theory of
relativity, on the other hand, space as opposed to “what fills space”,
[. . . ], has no separate existence. [. . . ]. If we imagine the gravitational
field, i.e. the functions gik, to be removed, there does not remain a
space of the type (1) [i.e. Minkowski space], but absolutely nothing.
(Einstein, 1954, pp. 175-176)
Consequently, spacetime does not only lose any distinct ontological status, but,
more importantly, being physically indiscernible from the gravitational field,
it turns out to be a dynamical entity among the others. Therefore, Rovelli
argues, according to GR there are only ‘dynamical fields in interactions with
one another’ (Rovelli, 2007, p. 1312). The physical world consists uniquely of
interacting dynamical entities, including spacetime.
According to Rovelli, this is the profound relationalism of GR. Since there
are only dynamical entities, including spacetime, there is no preferred physical
(i.e. observable) time variable t in the dynamics of GR. All physical variables are
instead on a par with the others. Therefore, physics does no longer describe ‘the
evolution of the variables in time’, but ‘the relative evolution of the variables’
(Rovelli, 2014, p. 751). In other words, physics does not account of change in
relation to time, but the relative change of dynamical entities in relation to each
other.
3.2 The relationalism of quantum theory
Rovelli believes that the relationalism of GR has a connection with the
relationalism of quantum theory. This is the primary motivation for his
proposal of an alternative interpretation of QM, called relational quantum
mechanics (RQM) (Rovelli, 1996, 2005; Dorato, 2015, 2016; Van Fraassen,
2010). In contrast to wave function realism (Ney and Albert, 2013), but more
generally to all realist interpretations of QM according to which the wave
function (the quantum state) |ψ〉 of a physical system is an actual and
fundamental physical object, RQM holds that the wave function has no
physical reality, but is a mere book-keeping device to compute probabilities of
possible measurement outcomes. RQM instead advocates an event ontology
according to which ‘the actual elements of reality’ are quantum events (Rovelli,
2004, p. 214). A quantum event is what happens in the physical interaction
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between systems, and corresponds to the values taken by the physical variables
(i.e., the observables) in the interaction process. For instance, the quantum
event of a system S interacting with another system O, is the value q taken by
a variable Q (such as position or momentum) of S in the interaction between
the two systems. This event is what is physically real, not the quantum state
|ψ〉. On Rovelli’s view, the reality of a particle, for instance, lies ‘in the events
where it reveals itself, interacting with its surrounding, not in the abstract
probability amplitude for such events’ (Rovelli, 2004, p. 214). Therefore, while
being antirealist as to the wave function, RQM is realist as to quantum events
(Rovelli, 2018b, p. 9). Consequently, the ontology of the physical world
consists of ‘relational quantum events happening at interactions between
physical systems’ (ibid., p. 7).
This is the core relationalism of RQM. Quantum events and quantum states
are meaningful only in relation to each other (Rovelli, 2004, p. 220). This
means that the values of the physical variables do not designate absolute states
or properties of a system at a given time, but the relation (interaction) of a
system with another system. Consequently, in quantum mechanics ‘all physical
variables are relational’ (Rovelli, 1996, p. 6) since ‘the actual value of all physical
quantities of any system is only meaningful in relation to another system’
(Rovelli, 2018b, p. 6). Therefore, the idea of an observer-independent state
of a physical system is entirely rejected. Quantum theory does not describe
the evolution of states (the wave function) and observables in time, as assumed
by the standard Schrödinger picture, but, according to the Heisenberg picture,
relations or correlations between observables; that is, how ‘physical systems
affect one another when they interact’ (Rovelli, 2004, p. 215). It is worth noting
that, according to Rovelli, the Heisenberg picture, in contrast to Schrödinger’s,
does not only provide a better understanding of QM, but is also crucial in the
formulation of quantum gravity. ‘The Heisenberg and Schrödinger pictures’, he
writes, ‘are equivalent if there is a normal time evolution in the theory, but in
the absence of a normal notion of time evolution, the Heisenberg picture remains
viable, and the Schrödinger picture becomes meaningless. In quantum gravity,
only the Heisenberg picture makes sense’ (Rovelli, 2001, p. 113). As a result,
the relationalism of GR for which the physical world is made up uniquely of
interacting dynamical fields converges with the relationalism of QM for which
‘the physical world can be described as a network of interacting components’
(Rovelli, 2004, p. 216).
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3.3 Quantum spacetime
This point of convergence between GR and QM suggests a decisive
implication, which lies at the basis of LQG. Since according to GR spacetime,
or the gravitational field, is a dynamical object, and since according to QM all
dynamical objects possess quantum properties (discreteness, indeterminism,
relationalism), it follows that ‘spacetime is a quantum object’ (Rovelli, 2001, p.
110). In other words, LQG predicts the existence of a quantum spacetime at
the fundamental level. This is expected to be composed of elementary ‘quanta
of space’, that is, intuitively, ‘grains’ or ‘atoms of space’, as quanta of the
gravitational field, the quantum interactions of which determine the dynamical
evolution of spacetime (Rovelli, 2004, 2016; Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014).
This understanding of quantum spacetime presents some similarities with
standard QFT, but also an important difference. The ‘quanta of space’ in LQG
are thought of as quantum excitations of the gravitational field analogously as
how QFT describes photons as quantum excitations of the electromagnetic field
and particles of ordinary matter as quanta of Dirac fields. However, because
of the background independence and relationalism of GR and QM according
to Rovelli’s relational interpretation, in LQG spacetime is not a background
against which the dynamical evolution of particles and fields is defined, as it
is still the case in QFT, in which usually one assumes a fixed, non-dynamical
spacetime geometry such as Minkowski space. In this sense, Rovelli insists that
the challenge of quantum gravity is ‘to understand what is a general-relativistic
QFT, or a background-independent QFT’ (Rovelli, 2004, p. 7).
Therefore, quantum spacetime is neither conceived of as an embedding for
events and processes nor as embedded in space and evolving in time. The
‘quanta of space’ are not quantum excitations in space, but of space (Rovelli,
2004, p. 264), since they are space itself, or rather, as Rovelli states, ‘the
spatiality of the world consists of the web of their interactions’ (Rovelli, 2018a,
p. 108), while the dynamical evolution of the network of these interactions is
spacetime. This description corresponds in LQG to the spin network and spin
foam formalism (Rovelli, 2004). Intuitively, the main idea, as Rovelli puts it, is
the following:
Space is a spin network whose nodes represent its elementary
grains, and whose links describe their proximity relations.
Spacetime is generated by processes in which these spin networks
transform into one another, and these processes are described by
sums over spinfoams. A spinfoam represents a history of a spin
network [. . . ]. (Rovelli, 2016, pp. 166-167)
So, while spin networks define the quantum geometry of spacetime, spin foams
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encode its quantum dynamics, as transition amplitudes for processes, that is,
as probabilities for events happening in interactions (Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014;
Rovelli, 2020; Perez, 2013).
In sum, the relationalism at the basis of fundamental physics lets emerge that
the ontology of the physical world according to LQG consists of, fundamentally,
a background-independent network of interacting quantum dynamical fields
(Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014), and, ultimately, of quantum events occurring in
physical interaction processes (Rovelli, 2016, 2018a). This leads us to what in
my view is the most challenging metaphysical implication of LQG.
4 The process metaphysics of loop quantum
gravity
LQG suggests that we should think of the physical world as fundamentally
timeless or atemporal yet ceaselessly changing; as a dynamical world of
interactions, events, processes in relation to each other. But what is actually
at stake? The key point is that, according to contemporary fundamental
physics, Rovelli argues, ‘the best grammar for thinking about the world is that
of change, not of permanence. Not of being, but of becoming ’ (Rovelli, 2018a,
p. 86; my emphasis). In other words, the ultimate metaphysical implication of
LQG is that an ever-changing world without time, uniquely made up of events
and relations involving physical interactions, is a world of nothing but
processes, without anything properly being and persisting changeless through
time.
This is the radical process metaphysics underlying LQG. In a decisive
passage, Rovelli writes:
We can think of the world as made up of things. Of substance. Of
entities. Of something that is; that persists. Or we can think of it
as made up of events. Of happenings. Of processes. Of something
that occurs. Something that does not last, which is continuous
transforming, that does not persist in time. The destruction of the
notion of time in fundamental physics is the crumbling of the first
of these two perspectives, not of the second. It is the realization of
the ubiquity of impermanence, not of stasis in a motionless time.
(Rovelli, 2018a, pp. 86-87; translation modified)
It is interesting to note that here Rovelli closely links to Smolin, despite their
otherwise notoriously different views. Indeed, Smolin agrees that if the world
were composed of objects, then
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the primary description of something would be how it is, and change
in it would be secondary. Change would be nothing but alterations
in how something is. But relativity and quantum theory each tell us
that this is not how the world is. They tell us [. . . ] that our world
is a history of processes. Motion and change are primary. Nothing
is, except in a very approximate and temporary sense. [. . . ]. So, to
speak the language of the new physics we must learn a vocabulary in
which process is more important than, and prior to, stasis. (Smolin,
2001, p. 53)
Rovelli and Smolin’s argument is of crucial philosophical importance, for they
are not claiming that every ‘thing’ or ‘object’ is subject to property changes
over time. Indeed, this would not only imply a violation of the background
independence of LQG, but, more importantly, it would entail a form of
Aristotelian conception of change as accidental determination of an individual
substance (‘something that is’), and thus a commitment to the metaphysical
view that change depends on the category of substance.
Let me briefly clarify this important point. For Aristotle, whenever there is
change there must be some ‘thing’, as substance, that changes, or whose
properties change. Since the notion of substance (ousia) is the primary
meaning of being, it is ontologically prior to, and more fundamental than, any
change and, indeed, any other way of being. As Jonathan Schaffer has recently
suggested, a substance may be seen as a fundamental ‘unit of being ’ (Schaffer,
2009, p. 351). Consequently, if there were no substances, there would be no
change at all, because literally nothing would be (Aristotle, 1984a, Cat. 5,
2b6b–6c). Therefore, for there to be change there is to be a ‘primary
substance’ as substratum (hypokeimenon) of change, which in turn has to
persist unchanged – ‘one and the same’, Aristotle qualifies – through time
(Aristotle, 1984a, Cat. 5, 4a10–21). Identity and persistence through temporal
change are indeed the most distinctive features of substance. Given its
ontological priority the notion of substance has a further fundamental
explanatory primacy. Understanding what something is (ti esti), ultimately
means understanding what ‘primary substance’ or being it is, that is to say, its
essence (to ti ên einai) (Aristotle, 1984b, Metaph. Z 3, 1028b34–36; Z 7,
1032b1–2).
The argument by Rovelli and Smolin is therefore a radical rejection of such
substance metaphysics. Their ontological claim is that, fundamentally, there is
change, but no ‘thing’ that changes. In other words, change is all what there
is, for ‘things’, including spacetime, are change, process, or becoming as such;
they are events, not ‘something that is’ (i.e. a substance). ‘An event’, Smolin
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suggests, ‘may be thought of as the smallest part of a process, a smallest unit of
change’ (Smolin, 2001, p. 53; my emphasis). As we have seen, for Rovelli, the
physical world is a network of interacting systems in which what is real are only
relative quantum events occurring in physical interactions. Quantum spacetime
is itself an event, since, as any quantum event, the ‘quanta of space’, Rovelli
writes, ‘exist only as terms of ceaseless interactions’ (Rovelli, 2018a, p. 108;
translation modified). Consequently, spacetime is itself a process (Rovelli and
Vidotto, 2014, p. 52); it is the process of the local interactions between ‘quanta
of space’, and ‘this interacting’, Rovelli crucially states, ‘is the happening of
the world’ (Rovelli, 2018a, p. 108; translation modified). In other words, the
physical world is no substantial ‘thing’ or object ‘that is’ at all, but process,
becoming, event (p. 88). The physical world is nothing but a ‘network of
quantum processes’ (Rovelli, 2020, p. 129; my emphasis).
Ultimately, it is the very category of substance, and thus the notions of
independent being, individual thing, substratum, essence, persisting identical
through temporal change, that is completely refuted in favour of the category
of process. Moreover, since it is the notion of substance to disappear altogether,
it is its presumed explanatory power that vanishes as well. Rovelli makes
this point explicitly: ‘we understand the world by studying change, not by
studying things’, for physics concerns ‘how events happen, not how things are’;
in other words, ‘we understand the world in its becoming, not in its being’
(Rovelli, 2018a, pp. 89, 91, 92). Therefore, LQG suggests a process metaphysics
and ontology of the physical world which holds the primacy of becoming over
being, and thus lend support to the thesis that nature should be understood as
consisting of ‘processes all the way down’.
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